Trump's Board of Peace, what's next in Iran, and E1 settlement construction

Summarized transcript:

Maytal:
Nice to see you again, Jon, and welcome back. It was also great to see you on CBC and CTV this past week—we’ll share some of those links for viewers and listeners. I want to pick up on some of what you were discussing there, so let’s jump right in.

The big news this week, not only internationally but also for Canada, is Trump announcing a move to Phase Two of the ceasefire deal, along with further details about the Board of Peace. We know that Prime Minister Mark Carney has been invited to participate and has accepted in principle, though many details are still unclear. By answering some questions, we seem to have opened up many more.

Let’s start at a high level. What are your first impressions of what we’re hearing—Carney’s reaction, the reaction of other leaders, and so on?

Jon:
Let me start by going back a bit. I think everyone would prefer that the United Nations was functioning properly, that the Security Council was functioning, and that it wasn’t just the United States, or Donald Trump, acting as the key player on Israel–Palestine.

But the UN really hasn’t played a meaningful role for a long time, beyond passing resolutions that don’t have much effect. So we’re stuck with the Americans, and in 2026, we’re stuck with Donald Trump.

On the positive side, he did end the fighting for the most part. Hundreds of Palestinians have still been killed, Hamas has not been disarmed, and so on, but the massive killing stopped, and some aid is flowing.

Moving to Phase Two, if it works, would mean Israel withdrawing essentially to its borders, Hamas being disarmed or decommissioned in some form, and day-to-day governance of Gaza being handed over to a Palestinian technocratic committee that has already been named and has met.

That committee would be overseen by a set of boards, with Trump ultimately at the top. If that could function, if humanitarian assistance increased, rubble clearing began, and reconstruction started, it would be a very good thing.

People are extremely cynical, partly because the Israeli government isn’t keen on this happening. Netanyahu has already said he disapproves of the technocratic committee, Rafah hasn’t been opened, and people are skeptical because this is Donald Trump and his circle—Witkoff, Kushner, and others—running the show.

I understand the cynicism. But this is the only game in town. Unlike Greenland, where I fully support pushing back on Trump, pushing back here leaves you with the status quo, and the status quo, with over half of Gaza controlled by Israel, an undefined “yellow line,” insufficient humanitarian aid, and no progress, is not a real alternative.

As for Prime Minister Carney, I understand that Canada won’t be committing a billion dollars at this stage, which is fine. This is a multi-year process. Carney has said he wants more information, particularly around humanitarian access, which is clearly lacking right now. So Canada is waiting and seeing.

Macron has decided not to join, that’s his choice. Carney, meanwhile, has two reasons for engaging. First, he doesn’t want to antagonize Trump. Second, if this process actually functions, his background in finance could be genuinely useful in ensuring accountability and transparency. That may be wishful thinking, but it’s not implausible.

Maytal:
You’re absolutely right that the status quo isn’t acceptable. We have to move. But what would that actually look like on the ground, particularly around Hamas and security?

Jon:
If a Palestinian technocratic government moves into Gaza and begins working with Hamas, there are three key elements that have to be addressed.

First is infrastructure—particularly the tunnels, which Israel is deeply concerned about. Second are the heavy weapons: rockets, RPGs, and so on. Third are the weapons Hamas claims it needs for self-defense, especially given that there are groups in Gaza, some funded by Israel, that would like to eliminate Hamas entirely.

That process is difficult but not mysterious—we know what would need to be done. The Palestinian Authority has said it doesn’t want to disarm Hamas, and the Muslim countries that have discussed participating in a stabilization force have also said they don’t want that responsibility.

That leaves the technocratic committee, which has specific portfolios, finance, policing, infrastructure, and so on. If that Gaza-based body is allowed to function and can manage Hamas, that’s step one.

At the same time, Israel would need to show good faith by pulling back from the yellow line as these steps begin. Humanitarian aid would also have to flow properly, which remains unclear. The Board of Peace talks about private companies handling aid, but it’s not clear whether non-profits will be included or whether Israel’s disqualification of many aid organizations will stand.

Rubble clearing alone is projected to take three years and billions of dollars. There are even discussions—some speculative—about using the rubble to create land extensions or a port. The key question is whether Trump and his team will continue pushing Israel to allow any of this to happen.

Maytal:
That leads into Iran. Will what’s happening there, continued protests, economic collapse, have any effect on Hamas or other Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah?

Jon:
There’s no doubt that Israel’s actions against Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have weakened them. The economic crisis in Iran is also having an impact.

One of the protesters’ core complaints isn’t just inflation or lack of water, it’s that enormous sums are being spent funding proxies while ordinary Iranians suffer. That resentment is real.

What’s also interesting is that Israel has been urging Trump not to intervene militarily in Iran right now. Analysts in Israel argue that a strike would only worsen the situation. This isn’t Venezuela or Panama, you can’t just go in, remove a leader, and leave. The Revolutionary Guard remains a massive force.

A week ago, some economists predicted a symbolic U.S. strike, but it hasn’t happened. For now, protests appear to have been crushed. Casualty estimates range from 3,000 to over 5,000, possibly more. The anger hasn’t disappeared, but people are lying low.

Sanctions are worsening economic hardship, and ordinary Iranians, people the world has no quarrel with, are paying the price.

There’s also a strange accusation floating around that liberal Jews should be criticized for focusing more on Israel than on Iran. But Iranians are criticizing their own regime. Progressive Jews focus on Israel because Israel is part of us, we want it to be better.

That doesn’t mean we support the Iranian regime. It means our sense of responsibility is different.

Maytal:
And in many ways, that actually reinforces the argument we’ve always made: support people, criticize regimes. What we’re seeing from Iranians in the streets is different from Israel, but also deeply relatable.

To love a country means being willing to speak out when leaders act against its future. That’s not hypocrisy—it’s civic responsibility.

Jon:
Exactly. And you see the same thing in the Iranian diaspora. They don’t hate Iran, they want a better Iran. They’re not unified around a single alternative, but they are united in opposing the current government, not the country itself.

Maytal:
If the regime were to fall, is there a clear alternative ready to step in?

Jon:
Unfortunately, no. The Shah’s son has positioned himself as a possible unifying figure, but many Iranians oppose that. He doesn’t want to dismantle the state Iraq-style, but it’s unclear how realistic his plan is.

There isn’t a clear successor the way some thought Venezuela had. That uncertainty is one reason foreign intervention is so risky, you don’t know what comes next.

Maytal:
Let’s zoom back in to Israel–Palestine. Last week, Israel issued construction tenders for the E1 area, about 3,400 units. This is often called the “doomsday settlement” because of its impact on a two-state solution.

We’ve been advocating for targeted Canadian sanctions on construction companies operating in occupied territory. Even if E1 doesn’t kill the two-state solution outright, it certainly threatens its viability. What happens next, and how can we push back effectively?

Jon:
Trump has blocked formal annexation, just as he did during his first term. But de facto annexation has accelerated, more settlements, more violence, more displacement of Palestinians.

E1 is fundamentally different from settlement blocs near the Green Line, which were always assumed to be part of land swaps. E1 would cut the West Bank in two, making a viable Palestinian state nearly impossible.

Some of this could theoretically be reversed, but the more it advances, the harder that becomes. Targeted sanctions, against ministers, advocacy groups, and construction companies are appropriate responses to de facto annexation.

Maytal:
Our latest survey of Canadian Jews shows that a majority still supports a two-state solution, even after two years of war. Support actually increases when it’s framed as part of a regional normalization agreement. That tells us something important.

Our message isn’t anger at Israel, it’s commitment to Israel’s future. But actions like E1 directly undermine the future people say they want. We need to be bolder in saying that.

Jon:
Regional normalization has always required movement on the Palestinian issue. The Saudis have made that crystal clear. This Israeli government will never deliver it, and Israel cannot thrive in isolation.

Israel doesn’t want to be a Sparta. A country that survives alone, surrounded by hostility, will lose its brightest young people. Both Israelis and diaspora Jews understand this—polling consistently shows it when the question is framed properly.

The people are ready. The leadership isn’t.

Maytal:
Netanyahu never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

Jon:
That’s exactly right.

Maytal:
John, thank you so much. This was a great conversation. We’ll talk again soon.