If War Has to Be Done, So Does Peace

Though still unconfirmed, the potential framework includes the release of the hostages, an Arab-led coalition governing Gaza, the expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, and some formal movement toward the recognition of a Palestinian state. In exchange, Israel will gain US recognition of sovereignty over certain areas of the West Bank.

But beneath the surface of this deal lies another layer of political calculation. Increasingly, it appears that the war with Iran was not primarily about eliminating nuclear infrastructure, but rather about providing Prime Minister Netanyahu with an off-ramp.

A way to end the war in Gaza while claiming victory: over Iran, over Hamas, and over internal dissent. Netanyahu can now argue that he has weakened Iran and its proxies, brought home the hostages, and preserved Israeli security. And in some reports, still speculative, he may even be seeking to secure a promise that his corruption trial be dropped as part of the deal.

This would mean that the hostages have effectively been held twice: once by Hamas, and again by Netanyahu, whose political survival may hinge on their continued captivity, and who will continue to cynically use the hostages to unshackle himself from his ongoing corruption trial. It’s a stark and troubling reality.

At the same time, Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners are already voicing fierce opposition to any proposal that hints at Palestinian statehood. Even the suggestion of a vague pathway toward a two-state solution is being met with hostility. Their reaction is a reminder of how narrow the political space for peace has become, and how vital it is a true opposition fill it.

We must also be mindful of the commentary and rhetoric we’ve seen in recent weeks. A wave of op-eds and think pieces justified the war with Iran as something that “had to be done.” We have previously raised serious concerns about this framing, how it narrows moral imagination, closes off alternatives, and makes war seem inevitable.

But if those same voices insist that war was a tragic necessity, they must also speak with equal conviction about the necessity of peace. To wring one's hands over a war of “no choice,” yet offer no hope or assurance for a peace of “no choice,” reveals that the hand-wringing may have been applause all along.

If war is something that “had to be done,” then peace must be, too. And painful concessions, when made in the name of peace, must be afforded the same moral gravity, the same urgency, as those made in the name of war.

Continuing the current trajectory, or settling for a new version of the status quo, will only bring us back to the same place. Perhaps even worse than what we saw on October 7, and in the nearly two years of violence since. This is the cycle we must break. Not with vague slogans, but with clear-eyed recognition that paradigm shifts, though painful, are necessary.

Progressives cannot afford to disengage. When the Abraham Accords were first signed, many responded with silence or rejection. These accords were rightly criticized for attempting to sidestep the Palestinian issue, treating it as an obstacle to bypass rather than the very core of any lasting regional solution, but by walking away, the ability to shape them is forfeited entirely.

If this new moment opens a door, even a narrow one, toward ending the war, bringing home the hostages, and setting a course toward two states, we must walk through it. We must acknowledge what is promising, criticize what is dangerous, and work from within to push for better outcomes.

And we must demand that those who believed war was necessary now speak with equal force about the necessity of peace.

This is not a time for cynicism. This is a time for courage. A time to insist that peace, too, must be done.

Israelis must see the hostages return and the war end so that healing from the trauma of October 7 can begin. Palestinians must see the devastation of their land end, and a hopeful horizon emerge, free from both Israeli occupation and extremist leaders like Hamas. Canada must remain steadfast in its commitment to a two-state solution, and the painful concessions required for peace must be pursued even more urgently than those made for war.