Ceasefire, Sovereignty, and the Cost of Political Paralysis

We were rightly skeptical earlier in phase one regarding the ISF, as it was, and remains far-fetched to expect any foreign country to send troops not to serve as peacekeepers, but as peace implementers — that is, to confront Hamas head-on and engage in active battle.

Likewise, a foreign force occupying swaths of the Gaza Strip would still constitute a foreign military occupation, even if the occupier is not Israel. Expecting improved relationships or trust between such a force and Palestinian civilians in Gaza is therefore unrealistic.

Trump, who committed to naming the members of the Board of Peace and advancing to phase two before the end of the year, has now pushed that timeline back to early in the new year.

Following Israel’s killing of senior Hamas commander Raed Saad, the U.S. administration publicly admonished Israel and stated it was “looking into” whether Israel had violated the ceasefire. Four Gazan civilians were also reportedly struck and killed in the attack.

At the current impasse, those who stand to gain the most are Hamas. They know that no foreign army will agree to be stationed in Gaza, and they also know that the option most obvious, and most threatening to them, namely the Palestinian Authority taking over parts of the Strip, is vehemently opposed by Netanyahu and his far-right coalition.

In the absence of a phase two that clearly indicates a slow and structured handover of weapons alongside a transfer of administrative authority, the best course of action for Hamas would be to simply allow the stalemate to continue. This would give them time to rebuild, recruit, and once again provide basic services to Gaza’s residents, thereby cementing their position as the only governing body capable of caring for the population.

This is, of course, a gamble. It remains unclear whether a population that has endured nearly two years of brutal war and widespread destruction would be so quick to forgive, or, if not forgive, then at least forget, and so easily place its faith back in Hamas and its administration. But in the absence of any alternative governing body, and as desperation grows and the weather turns cold, even begrudging support may be enough for Hamas to solidify its foothold as the de facto leadership of Gaza.

Since the beginning of the war, it has been understood by large swaths of the Israeli population and many in the diaspora that it was advantageous for Netanyahu to weaken the Palestinian Authority while simultaneously strengthening Hamas.

Keeping the two administrative bodies separate and divided, while portraying the PA as too weak and corrupt to negotiate with, and asserting that Israel cannot negotiate with Hamas terrorists, reinforces the argument that Israel therefore has no choice but to maintain the so-called “status quo” of occupation and siege.

But a return to that so-called “status quo” should not be understood as a return to a pre-October 7 world to which we are eager to return. Rather, it should be seen as a dire warning: that the status quo was always a mirage; that a population cannot be occupied indefinitely, with no hope, without eventually rising up; that avoiding political solutions in favour of militaristic ones is not a strategy; and that financing, securing, and managing occupied territory ultimately endangers not only those living under occupation, but those living within one’s own borders.

The longer this impasse in advancing the ceasefire continues, the greater the risk that Israel returns to an October 6, 2023 mindset, both in its avoidance of a political solution and in increasing the likelihood and dangers of another October 7.

Netanyahu is still able to convince some that he is still the protector of Israel and the only one capable of keeping it safe. Not only was this belief proven catastrophically wrong on October 7, but protecting and securing one’s people actually requires action. Flatly refusing every term and condition in a diplomatic agreement, while offering no viable alternative, reflects a lack of leadership rather than statesmanship.

Netanyahu has long been a master at avoiding decisions and dragging out outcomes in an effort to placate various factions of his coalition, all while making the preservation of his political survival his primary objective. It has always felt as though his survival mattered above all else, even the safety of his citizens, but it is now clear as day that this is indeed the case.

Avoiding decisions and refusing to take on the responsibility of leadership is not only steering Israel toward a dangerous new reality; it risks returning the Jewish people to a pre-state world, even if only metaphorically.

A world in which we are at the mercy of foreign governments, lacking governance over our own affairs, and without decision-making power over our own future.

If Netanyahu chooses to continue waiting for Trump to push him into various corners in order to keep the ceasefire limping along, we can only hope that Trump remains engaged and keeps pushing.

But if Trump loses interest and Israel slowly returns to a pre-October 7 status quo, now compounded by at least a partial occupation of the Gaza Strip, Israelis will be in grave danger. And even if Trump continues to push, the immediate battle may be won, but the broader war will have been lost.

Not the war between Israel and Hamas, in which there were no winners, but the war for our continued sovereignty in a Jewish and democratic state.

We are Zionists because we believe we deserve self-determination and sovereignty in our own nation-state. That sovereignty demands bold leadership that keeps people safe, not leadership that is pushed around by foreign actors and is thoroughly unable or unwilling to make independent decisions.

What the coming weeks and months will bring will shape not only the short term, but will also carry serious long-term repercussions. It is worth asking whether this is truly what the sovereignty fought for over thousands of years is meant to look like.